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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20020892-CA 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
In reply to the State's arguments, Appellant Anthony James Valdez makes two 
assertions. First, Mr. Valdez opposes the State's request to forego oral arguments and a 
published opinion. This is because both procedures are appropriate under the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Under Rule 29, oral arguments are allowed unless this Court 
determines that the appeal is frivolous, the issue has already been authoritatively decided, 
or the briefing is inadequate and argument would not be helpful. Utah R. App. P. 29 
(2002). But we have none of those circumstances here and the State has not alleged any 
of them. Also, regarding the State's request to forego a published opinion, Rules 30 and 
31 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure indicate that a written opinion should be 
issued. Utah R. App. P. 30 & 31(b) (2002). Whether that opinion should be published is 
within the discretion of this Court, but it is appropriate here because this is an issue of 
first impression. So, both oral arguments and a published opinion are appropriate in this 
case. 
Second, the State has failed to distinguish the crimes of forgery and identity fraud. 
Specifically, the State's argument that there are three ways to distinguish the crimes is 
incorrect. The State first says that forgery requires a writing whereas identity fraud does 
not. Appellee's Br. 9. But this is simply not true. Forgery may be committed in a variety 
of ways besides writing, including transmitting information by computer, erasing 
information on a document, handing someone a falsified stock certificate, and 
misrepresenting a property interest. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (1999); Charles E. 
Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 496 (15th ed. 1996). Next, the State says that identity 
fraud involves the use of a living person's information, whereas forgery does not 
distinguish between living, dead, or fictitious people. Appellee's Br. 9. However, this is 
not apparent from the statutes and there is no relevant holding in interpretive case law. 
So, this does not distinguish the statutes. Finally, the State argues that identity fraud 
requires proof of the value of items the defendant tried to obtain, whereas forgery does 
not. Appellee's Br. 9. However, proof of value is related to sentencing, not completion of 
the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(3) (Supp. 2002). So, proof of value is not an 
element for Shondel purposes and it is irrelevant in determining whether identity fraud 
proscribes the same conduct as forgery. 
In sum, all of the State's arguments fail, and so Mr. Valdez's sentence for forgery 
should be vacated and this case remanded for re-sentencing under the identity fraud 
2 
statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ORAL ARGUMENTS ARE APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE. AND AN 
OPINION SHOULD BE PUBLISHED AT THIS COURT'S DISCRETION 
Under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, oral arguments should be heard in 
this case and a published opinion is appropriate. This is because the rules provide for 
these procedures in this case. 
First, oral argument should be allowed in this case under Rule 29 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under Rule 29, oral argument should be allowed in every 
case unless this Court concludes that: 
(1) The appeal is frivolous; or 
(2) The dispositive issue or set of issues has been recently authoritatively 
decided; or 
(3) The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and 
record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral 
argument. 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a) (2002); Brown v. Glover. 2000 UT 89, If 17, 16 P.3d 540. In this 
case, none of those circumstances apply. This appeal is not frivolous because it is 
soundly based upon the well-accepted Shondel doctrine which holds that, when there is 
uncertainty about which of two punishments is applicable, the lesser applies. State v. 
ShondeL 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969). Also, there is persuasive authority supporting 
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Mr. Valdez' position that the forgery and identity fraud statutes proscribe the same 
conduct, and he is therefore entitled to the more lenient sentence.1 Further, this issue has 
not been authoritatively decided in Utah and so thorough examination of the issue, 
including hearing oral arguments, is appropriate. Finally, oral argument is appropriate in 
this case to help with the comparison and interpretation of the different elements of the 
statutes and to determine whether they are the same under the Shondel doctrine. So, oral 
argument should be heard. 
Secondly, a written opinion is required in this case under Rules 30 and 31 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and publishing is desirable. Under Rules 30 and 31, 
this Court may dispose of a case without written opinion only if the case falls into one of 
the following categories: 
(1) appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues based primarily on 
documents; 
(2) summary judgments; 
(3) dismissals for failure to state a claim; 
(4) dismissals for lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction; and 
(5) judgments or orders based on uncomplicated issues of law.2 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(1) & (2) (Supp. 
2002); State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^ 34, 52 P.3d 1210; State v. Frampton. 737 P.3d 183,195 n.59 
(Utah 1987); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 478-80, 496 (15th ed. 1996). 
2
 Utah R. App. P. 31(b) (2002). See also Utah R. App. P. 30(d) (2002) (stating that 
decisions may be issued without opinions only as provided in Rule 31(b)). 
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This shows that, in this case, there must be a written opinion. This is because this 
is not an appeal based on documented facts, nor is it a summary judgment appeal or an 
appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Also, the appeal does not involve a 
jurisdictional issue. And, it does not involve an uncomplicated issue of law. On the 
contrary, this appeal involves the comparison of statutory elements under the Shondel 
doctrine. This is a painstaking process that cannot be completed without thoughtful 
analysis and decision-making. So, a written opinion should be issued in this case 
pursuant to Rules 30 and 31. 
Of course, whether to publish the decision is within the discretion of this Court.3 
However, publishing is desirable in this case because the question of whether there is a 
Shondel relationship between forgery and identity fraud has not been decided in Utah. 
Further, a decision on this issue is important because it will affect the way defendants are 
charged and sentenced with these types of crimes. So, Mr. Valdez requests that this Court 
use its discretion to publish the opinion in this case. 
II. THE STATE HAS FAILED TO DISTINGUISH THE CRIMES OF 
FORGERY AND IDENTITY FRAUD 
The State attempts to distinguish forgery and identity fraud on three bases, and all 
of them crumble upon examination. 
3
 See State ex rel D.C.. 963 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (showing that publishing 
is a choice of the court). 
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First of all, the State claims that forgery is distinguished from identity fraud 
because forgery requires a writing whereas identity fraud does not. Appellee's Br. 9. 
However, this is not true. Forgery does not require a writing. Forgery may be perpetrated 
in many ways that include writing, but is not exclusive to writing. Wliile the statute does 
use the term "writing," Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999), it also uses a variety of 
other terms to describe forgery, including making, completing, executing, authenticating, 
issuing, transferring, publishing, or uttering a writing, or even purporting to do any of 
those things. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (l)(b) (1999). None of these involve actual 
writing. Furthermore, the statute itself broadens the term "writing" to include any 
electronic use of information: 
"[W]riting" includes printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any 
other method of recording valuable information including forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, 
and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; (b) a 
security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a 
government or any agency; or (c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any 
other instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim against 
property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or 
enterprise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (1999). With all of this, it cannot be claimed that forgery 
occurs only if the defendant writes something. 
This has been recognized in the case law and treatises. For instance, defendants 
have been prosecuted for forgery for manipulating a computer-controlled payroll 
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distribution system,4 altering driver's license information on a computer disc,5 using a 
fellow prison inmate's telephone account number to make calls,6 adding numbers to a 
copy of a check that had been submitted during discovery in a civil case,7 attempting to 
withdraw money from another's bank account,8 e-mailing a copy of a signature,9 and 
altering a name on a traffic ticket.10 Notably, these cases not only show that forgery be 
committed without writing anything, but also that the same behavior that is punishable 
under the identity fraud statute is also punishable under the forgery statute. 
Further, Wharton's Criminal Law and the forgery statute itself give an extensive 
list of examples of forgery that do not involve writing anything. Some of these examples 
are erasing portions of a bond, altering the amount of a check, transmitting information 
by computer, erasing information on a document, handing someone a falsified stock 
certificate, and misrepresenting a property interest. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) 
(1999); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 484-85, 496 (15th ed. 1996). 
In sum, the forgery statute does not require that a perpetrator write anything, and 
4
 Gordon v. State, 425 S.E.2d 906, 908 (Ga. App. 1992). 
5
 People v. Avila. 770 P.2d 1330, 1332 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). 
6
 Commonwealth v. Delapaz. 796 A.2d 364, 365 (Pa. 2002). 
7
 Hodge v. State. 626 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981). 
8
 State v. Brown. 809 P.2d 559, 560 (Kansas Ct. App. 1991). 
9
 Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro. Inc.. 314 F.3d 289, 296 (7th Cir. 2002). 
10
 Campbell v. Commonwealth. 431 S.E.2d 648, 649 (Va. 1993). 
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so this does not distinguish forgery from identity fraud. 
The State next tries to distinguish the two statutes on the basis that identity fraud 
involves the use of a living person's information, whereas forgery does not distinguish 
between living, dead, or fictitious people. Appellee's Br. 9. However, this distinction is 
not apparent from the statutes, and there is no interpretive case law to support the State's 
position. 
While it is true that the forgery statute specifically provides that the person whose 
information is forged may be either "existent or nonexistent," Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
501(l)(b) (1999), there is nothing to show the same is not true for identity fraud. The 
identity fraud statute does not require that the person whose information is used be 
living. The statute readily covers the use of the information of a living, dead, or fictitious 
person. This is shown by the statute. The identity fraud statute says that: 
A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person knowingly or 
intentionally: 
(a) obtains personal information of another person without the 
authorization of that person; and 
(b) uses, or attempts to use, that information with fraudulent intent, 
including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit goods, services, any other 
thing of value, or medical information in the name of another person 
without the consent of that person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (2) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). 
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The plain meaning11 of the term "person" used in the statute is apparent from the 
statutory definition, legal definitions, and the case law. In a nutshell, "person" is used to 
describe living persons, fictitious persons such as corporations, and often, dead persons. 
This is shown by the statutory definition of "person." That is, a person is "an individual, 
public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(8) (1999). This makes sense in the identity fraud context 
because many times someone could attempt to perpetrate fraud using the personal 
identifying information of a fictional person, such as a corporation, as easily as an 
individual. Certainly, there is no indication in the identity fraud statute that fraud against 
fictional persons such as business are exempt. 
What is more, the fluidness of the term "person" as it is used legally is noted in the 
usage guide A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage. This authority notes that the word is 
broadly used and, yet, sometimes does not even include living persons as we normally 
think of them: 
[The word person] illustrates the tendency lawyers have to take an ordinary 
English word and give it an unnatural meaning: "So far as legal theory is 
concerned, a person is any being whom the law regards as capable of rights 
and duties. Any being that is so capable is a person, whether a human being 
or not, and no being that is not so capable is a person, even though he be a 
man." . . . Lon Fuller, among others, has questioned whether person is the 
most desirable word for the concept What term might be better?: 
11
 See State v. McKinnon. 2002 UT App 214, %69 51 P.3d 729 ("when interpreting 
statutes, our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature. To discern 
the legislature's intent and purpose, we look first to the best evidence of a statute's meaning, the 
plain language of the act.) (Quotations omitted). 
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Fuller suggests "legal subject" or ffright-and-duty bearing unit." On second 
thought, perhaps "person" is not quite so bad. 
Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 654 (1987). The bottom line is 
that "person," as it is used in statutes and legal writings, has a more fluid meaning than it 
ordinarily carries. 
This concept supports that "person," as it is used in the identity fraud statute, 
includes dead persons as well as living and fictitious persons. This is because it is 
illogical to believe that the drafters did not intend to punish those who use the names, 
social security numbers, driver's license numbers, and so on of dead persons. Such 
information is often readily available and the fact that the person is dead may even 
benefit a perpetrator by giving him more time to commit crime. Further, there is nothing 
in the statute that indicates otherwise. 
Similar crimes against dead persons have been recognized in the case law. In fact, 
in the case of State v. Germonto. the defendant killed a victim and, after he was dead, 
used his checks to commit a forgery. State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 54-55 (Utah 1993). 
His conviction on the forgery was affirmed. Id. at 64. Other types of property crimes may 
be committed against dead persons.12 So, there is no reason in this case to interpret the 
identity fraud statute as excluding those who use the information of dead persons. In fact, 
12
 A number of property crimes do not require that the victim be living. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 2002) (no requirement that victim of burglary be living); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999) (no requirement that victim of theft be living); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
407 (1999) (no requirement that victim of theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered property 
be living). 
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use of the personal information of living, fictitious, or dead persons is prohibited by the 
statute, and this shows that identity fraud is the same as forgery. 
Lastly, the State argues that identity fraud is distinguished from forgery because 
identity fraud requires proof of the value of items that a defendant tried to obtain, 
whereas forgery does not. Appellee's Br. 9. However, this is not a distinguishing factor. 
The proof of value requirement of identity fraud is included solely for sentencing 
purposes. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(3) (Supp. 2002). The statute demonstrates this. 
The statute coordinates the value of the thing obtained, or attempted to be obtained, with 
the class of crime. For instance, if the value is less than $300, the crime is a class B 
misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(3)(a). If it is between $300 and $1,000, or 
the value cannot be determined, it is a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
1102(3)(b) (Supp. 2002). This valuation process goes all the way to a second degree 
felony for a value at or exceeding $5,000. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(3)(d) (Supp. 
2002). None of these valuations are part of the elements of the crime. They go only to 
sentencing and are there only for that purpose. And so, forgery and identity fraud are not 
distinguished on that basis. 
In sum, the State has failed to distinguish forgery and identity fraud. These crimes 
have the same elements. Therefore, under the Equal Protection Clause as explained in the 
Shondel doctrine, Mr. Valdez is entitled to the lesser penalty of class B misdemeanor 
identity fraud, rather than the third-degree felony theft. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Valdez respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
sentence for forgery and remand for re-sentencing under the identity fraud statute. 
SUBMITTED this /<?*» day of May, 2003. 
LEATHER JOHNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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